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A prototype decision support system (DSS) was developed to enhance Navy tactical deci-
sion making based on  naturalistic decision processes.  Displays were developed to sup-
port critical decision making tasks through recognition-primed and explanation-based rea-
soning processes and cognitive analysis of the decision making problems faced by Navy
tactical officers in a shipboard Combat Information Center.  Baseline testing in high in-
tensity, peace keeping, littoral scenarios indicated that experienced decision makers were
not well served by current systems, and their performance revealed periodic loss of situa-
tion awareness.  A study is described with eight, expert Navy tactical decision making
teams that used either their current system alone or in conjunction with the prototype
DSS.  When the teams had the prototype DSS available, we observed significantly fewer
communications to clarify the tactical situation, significantly more critical contacts identi-
fied early in the scenario, and a significantly greater number of defensive actions taken
against imminent threats.  These findings suggest that the prototype DSS enhanced the
commanders’ awareness of the tactical situation, which in turn contributed to greater con-
fidence, lower workload, and more effective performance.
INTRODUCTION
For sensor data to be effective, the data they gener-
ate must be integrated and organized so that it is useful
information to the user.  Information must be meaning-
ful, timely, and easily accessible if it is to be useful.
Understanding how an operator uses information is
complicated by the effects the operational environment
may have on the human operators of a system.  The
U.S. Navy has recognized the criticality of such factors
in assuring mission effectiveness and minimizing inci-
dents of blue-on-blue (friendly) or blue-on-white (neu-
tral) engagements.  The Tactical Decision Making Un-
der Stress (TADMUS) program was initiated in re-
sponse to one such incident: the accidental shoot down
of an Iranian Airbus aircraft by the USS Vincennes in
1986.  The congressional investigation of this incident
suggested that emotional stress may have played a role
in contributing to this incident and the TADMUS pro-
gram was established to assess how stress might affect
decision making and what might be done to minimize
those effects.
 Development of a prototype decision support sys-
tem (DSS) was one thrust of the TADMUS project.
The objective of this effort was to evaluate and demon-
strate display concepts derived from current cognitive
theory with expert decision makers in an appropriate
test environment.  The focus of the DSS was on en-
hancing the performance of tactical decision makers
(viz., the Commanding Officer (CO) and Tactical Ac-
tion Officer (TAO) working as a team) for single ship,
air defense missions in high density, ambiguous littoral
warfare situations.  The approach taken in designing the
DSS was to analyze the cognitive tasks performed by
the decision makers in a shipboard Combat Information
Center (CIC) and then to develop a set of display mod-
ules to support these tasks based on the underlying deci-
sion making processes naturally used by the CO/TAO
team.
Cognitive task analyses identified two higher order
tasks performed by the CO/TAO team: situation as-
sessment and selection of alternative courses of action
(Kaempf, Wolf, & Miller, 1993).  The analyses indi-
cated that 87% of the information transactions associ-
ated with situation assessment involved feature match-
ing strategies (trying to match the observed events in the
scenario to those previously experienced), while 12% of
their actions were related to story generation strategies
(developing a novel hypothetical explanation to explain
the observed events).  With regard to selecting courses
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of action, command level decision makers relied almost
exclusively on recognition of applicable tactics based
on rules of engagement (94%), while much more rarely
developed a general selection strategy extrapolated
from previous experience (6% of actions selected).
.Baseline tests in representative littoral scenarios
corroborated these analyses (Hutchins & Kowalski,
1993; Hutchins, Morrison, & Kelly, 1996).  The com-
munications analysis indicated a predominance of fea-
ture matching strategies in assessing the situation typi-
cally followed by the selection among preplanned re-
sponse sets (tactics) that were considered to fit the
situation.  These tests also suggested that experienced
decision makers were not particularly well served by
current systems in demanding missions.  Teams exhib-
ited periodic losses of situation awareness, often linked
with limitations in human memory and shared attention
capacity.  Environmental stressors such as time com-
pression and highly ambiguous information increased
decision biases, e.g. confirmation bias, hypervigilance,
task fixation, etc.  Problems associated with short term
memory limitations included:  (a) mixing up track num-
bers (track being recalled as 7003 vs. 7033) and forget-
ting track numbers; (b) mixing up track kinematic data
(track recalled as descending vs. ascending in altitude,
closing vs. opening in range, etc.) and forgetting track
kinematic data; and (c) associating past track related
events/actions with the wrong track and associating
completed own-ship actions with the wrong track.
Problems related to decision biases included:  (a) car-
rying initial threat assessment throughout the scenario
regardless of new information (framing error) and (b)
assessing a track based on information other than that
associated with the track, e.g., old intelligence data,
assessments of similar tracks, outcomes of unrelated
events, past decision maker experiences, etc. (e.g. con-
firmation bias).
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM DESIGN
In effect, the CO and TAO decision makers were
behaving in a manner consistent with those predicted by
“naturalistic” decision making theory (Klein, 1993).
Therefore, this theory became central to the design of a
human-computer interface to improve tactical decision
making.  A prototype DSS was developed with the ob-
jectives of:  (1) minimizing the mismatches between
cognitive processes and the data available in the CIC to
facilitate decision making; (2) mitigating the shortcom-
ings of current CIC displays in imposing high informa-
tion processing demands and exceeding the limitations
of human memory; and (3) transferring the data in the
current CIC from numeric to graphical representations
wherever appropriate.  It was determined that the DSS
should not filter or extensively process data; i.e., it
should support rather than aid (automate) decision
making and leave as much decision making with the
decision makers as possible.  The design goal of the
DSS was to take the data that are already available in
the system and present it as meaningful information
where, when, and in the form it was needed relative to
the decision making tasks being performed.
The DSS was designed expressly for the evaluation
of display elements to support feature matching, story
generation (viz., Explanation-Based Reasoning (EBR)),
and Recognition-Primed Decision making (RPD) with
the goal of reducing errors, reducing workload, and
improving adherence to rules of engagement.  The de-
sign was significantly influenced by inputs from subject
matter experts to ensure its validity and usefulness for
the operational community.  It is implemented on a per-
sonal computer which may operate independent of, syn-
chronized with, or linked to a scenario driver simula-
tion.
Figure 1. TADMUS DSS Integrated display.
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Figure 1 shows the current DSS-2 prototype dis-
play.  The DSS-2 is a composite of several display
modules, which are arranged in a tiled format so that no
significant data are obscured by overlapping windows.
The DSS-2 is implemented with two 1024x768 CRT /
touch screen displays.  The display features an inte-
grated geo-plot and a variety of modules designed to
solve specific decision making problems encountered
by the tactical decision maker.  These modules will be
described  below as an illustration of how the informa-
tion requirements of tactical decision making tasks were
mapped with cognitive processes described in natural-
istic decision making theory.
Figure 2. Geo-plot with desaturated map, variable
coded symbology.
Geo-plot.
The left side of the display uses variable-coded
NTDS symbology (Osga, et al., ????) to represent the
position of air, surface, and sub-surface tracks over a
geographic region.  The module is intended to be the
primary focus of decision makers and is designed for
quick decision making associated with situation aware-
ness.  Symbols are color and shape coded to indicate
track identification and threat evaluation, and may be
toggled between NTDS symbols and track numbers.
Track numbers are the “language” of the CIC and allow
rapid location of various tracks.  Conceptually, the map
consists of several layers which may be altered to suit
particular mission requirements.  Shown is a desaturated
map (Osga, et al., ????) which provides sufficient spa-
tial reference for most tasks while minimizing screen
clutter and color for most decision making problems.
For strike or search and rescue missions, a topographi-
cal map may be overlaid. In addition, overlays for infra-
structure (highways, population densities, power grids,
etc.) may be added when necessary.   The use of a 2-
dimensional representation ensures tracks can be lo-
cated quickly with precision.  An optional 3-
dimensional display may be optionally displayed when
appropriate for assessing general spatial relations.
Controls for altering the geo-plot are arranged along the
left edge of the module.  In addition to selecting map
layers, scaling, and panning controls, the decision
maker may supplement the display with velocity leaders
to show the relative speed of all the tracks, with course
histories which show a track’s path over time relative to
landmarks, with air corridors, and with other tracks.
Weapon threat envelopes may be displayed for potential
threat tracks along with own ship to rapidly assess the
criticality of a threat.
Figure 3. Sample Mini-CRO
Multi-CRO Access Panel
Across the bottom of the displays is a series of
buttons for quick access to highest priority tracks. The
buttons serve as miniature character read outs (Mini-
CROs) displaying critical identification and kinematic
information about the track and allowing the status of
the most critical tracks to be monitored without any
additional interaction with the system. The buttons are
arranged by a fairly simple algorithm from highest pri-
ority on the left to lowest on the right.  As situations
evolve, the movement of the buttons quickly draws at-
tention to the changes, which helps preclude attention
fixation to a single track or task when the decision
maker is under stress.
Inside each track button is an alert button which is
cyan colored when a new alert has occurred since that
track was last accessed by the decision maker, and gray
when there are no new alerts.  Pressing and holding the
alert button generates a pop-up window to display a
chronological list of alerts that have occurred for the
selected track.  Track age is shown rather than the time
at which they occurred (as is the case with current sys-
tems) because decision makers are interested in how old
the alert is rather than when it occurred.
Track Profile
The track profile module complements the geo-plot
by showing a horizontal display of track altitude and
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range from own ship. Information requirements ad-
dressed by this module include the need to:  (1) see
where the track is now, (2) what the track has been do-
ing over time, (3) recognize whether the track can shoot
you, and (4) recognize whether you could shoot the
track - all at a glance.  An important aspect of this dis-
play is that it shows a historical plot of what the target
Figure 4. Track Profile with Aspect inset.
has done in space and time (the history is replayed each
time the target is selected).  This greatly reduces the
short term memory requirements on the CO and TAO in
interpreting the significance of the selected target and
inferring intent.  This historical dimension of the dis-
play allows the decision maker to see what the track has
done and primes his recognition of a template for likely
mission profiles which would account for the actions a
track has taken.  In addition, the profiles show own-ship
weapon and target threat envelopes displayed in terms
of range and altitude so that the decision maker can
visualize and compare mental models (templates) as he
considers possible track intentions and own ship op-
tions.  To further facilitate these evalutation, the track
profile incorporates two pull-down lists.  The “perspec-
tive picker” allows the decision maker to jump to other
friendly (joint / coalition) forces in the area so as to
assess the possibility that other assets are the target of
interest to a potentially hostile track, and to assess
whether those friendly units could assist in engaging a
prospective threat.  When an alternative perspective is
chosen, all modules in the display reflect the perspec-
tive and capabilities of the chosen asset.  The second
pull down list is a “weapons picker” that further elabo-
rates on capabilities and limitations of own ship and
other friendly units showing how different weapons
could be used against the selected track.  In the event
that a weapon system goes off-line, such information
would automatically be reflected in the weapons dis-
played in the pull-down list.  These capabilities are ex-
pected to play a significant role in Joint and Coalition
operations.
Embedded within the track profile is an inset
widow which shows own ship heading relative to the
selected track.  The display quickly shows radar cross
section and weapons cut outs for assessing whether own
ship should be maneuvered to optimize these parame-
ters.
Response Manager
The response manager is located immediately be-
low the track profile and is tied to it via a line indicating
the target’s current distance from own ship.  It repre-
sents a Gantt chart type display showing a template of
pre-planned actions and the optimal windows in which
to perform them.  The display serves as a graphical em-
bodiment of battle orders and doctrine, and shows
which actions have been taken with regard to the se-
lected track.  The display is intended to support RPD
and serves the need to: (1) recall the relevant tactics and
strategies for the type of target being assessed, (2) rec-
ognize which actions need to be taken with the target
and when they should be taken, and (3) remember
which actions have been taken and have yet to be taken
for the selected target.
Figure 5. Response Manager.
Track Summary
The track summary module, located in the top-right
corner of the display provides a more detailed summary
of current and historical data for the currently selected
track and represents and enhanced CRO.  The display
provides a quick-look at the tracks kinematics as well as
ancillary data such as available intelligence, electronic
warfare (EW) and Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF).
Current information is shown as a cyan color, while
historical or supplementary data is grayed-out.  Kine-
matics, (quantitative data), are read down from the track
number while track ID (verbal data) is read across.
Embedded within all CROs is unique feature of the DSS
- an altitude trend arrow which shows increasing, con-
stant or decreasing altitude.  This is a critical feature of
assessing threat intent which must be inferred by the
tactical decision maker using conventional systems.
There is a large pop-up window which may be accessed
to provide a larger view of (possibly) more detailed
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alerts.  This module is expected to be used when more
detailed information is required for EBR.
Figure 6. Track Summary.
Basis for Assessment
Figure 7.  Basis for Assessment.
The basis for assessment module was explicitly
designed to support EBR by providing a detailed list of
evidence for and against the current assessment of the
selected track.  It also presents unknown information
and implicit assumptions being made in accepting the
assessment of potential threat, non-threat or unknown.
This module supports EBR (story generation) by al-
lowing the decision maker to explore alternative hy-
potheses and to see how the available data does or does
not support them. The basis for assessment module pre-
sents the underlying data used to generate the DSS’s
threat assessment for the displayed track. The display
was designed to present the relevant data necessary for
a commander to consider and evaluate all likely expla-
nations for what a target may be, and what it may be
doing (i.e., assess “intents”) through the generation of
alternative stories to explain the available and missing
data regarding the target in question.  The display is
also intended to highlight data discrepant with a given
hypothesis in order to minimize confirmation and
framing biases.  Assumptions listed are those necessary
to “buy into” the selected assessment.  Further, the as-
sumptions are intended to prompt the decision maker to
consider ways to resolve ambiguity.  For instance, in
order to assess a track as a threat, it may be necessary to
assume that the track is carrying a weapon.   The deci-
sion maker could then use organic assets such as
friendly aircraft in the vicinity to fly out to the track to
assess whether this is in fact the case.  As a result, the
basis for assessment module is expected to be particu-
larly effective in helping sort out and avoid “Blue-on-
Blue” and “Blue-on-White” engagements.
DSS EVALUATION EXPERIMENT
The ultimate goal of any display design is to posi-
tively impact the performance of the person-machine
system of which it is a part.  Therefore, a study was
performed to examine how the DSS impacted the deci-
sion making of COs and TAOs relative to performance
in a traditional CIC in a medium-fidelity simulation.
Although the contributions of individual display mod-
ules could not be assessed objectively due to resource
limitations, overall effects of the DSS on decision per-
formance were examined in terms of a variety of per-
formance criteria1.
As we have discussed, there is substantial evidence
that experienced tactical decision makers employ fea-
ture matching and. to a lesser degree, story generation
strategies.  Moreover, various errors observed during
tactical scenarios and exercises have been linked with
basic cognitive limitations (memory, attention, etc.).  To
build on the naturalistic decision strategies that experi-
enced COs and TAOs use and to help overcome their
cognitive limitations, a series of decision support mod-
ules were developed.  Since these decision support
modules were developed with a user-centered design
perspective, we expected that they would be effective in
reducing decision maker errors.  Also, we expected that
COs and TAOs would consider these modules to be
useful and easy to use, since they were consistent with
                                                
1 The results reported here are for an earlier version of
the DSS, similar but not identical to the one described
above.  The tested DSS did not feature an integrated
geo-plot (but relied on the geo-plot currently in tactical
systems and the DEFTT simulator).  The tested DSS
had a “comparison to norms module” which provided
color-coded squares to show how well a set of critical
parameters for the selected track fit a template for
known threats and support pattern matching.  This
module was not well liked or used as had been intended
and was, therefore, dropped from the DSS-2.  The DSS-
2 is a refined version of the one tested, and it was re-
fined based on the results of this study. The DSS-2 is
being tested as this paper is written.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
the strategies that they use in processing information
and making decisions.
Despite these expectations, empirical tests are nec-
essary to determine whether the DSS was indeed helpful
to tactical decision makers.  Therefore, a study was per-
formed to examine how the DSS impacted the decision
making of COs and TAOs relative to performance in a
traditional CIC in a medium-fidelity simulation.  Al-
though the contributions of individual display modules
could not be assessed objectively due to resource limi-
tations, overall effects of the DSS on decision perform-
ance were examined in terms of a variety of perform-
ance criteria.
Method
Eight expert Navy tactical decision making teams
(with emphasis on the CO and TAO) used either their
current display systems alone or in conjunction with the
prototype DSS at NRaD’s Decision Evaluation Facility
for Tactical Teams (DEFTT) CIC simulator.  A within-
subject factorial design was employed across four test
scenarios such that each team performed two scenarios
with the DSS and two scenarios without it.  Scenarios
were constructed to simulate peace keeping missions
with a very high number of targets to be dealt with in a
short period of time (i.e. were time compressed), and
with a significant number of highly ambiguous tracks
regarding assessment and intent.  Subjects were given
appropriate geo-political and intelligence briefings prior
to each test run. The order of the scenarios and DSS
conditions was counterbalanced using a Latin Square.
Criterion-referenced training with the baseline DEFTT
display system and with the DSS was provided, and two
practice scenarios were run prior to beginning the test
session.  In addition to collecting objective data on tac-
tical actions, display usage, control inputs, and voice
communications, subjective assessments (via question-
naires and a structured interview) were solicited from
each CO and TAO at the conclusion of the test session.
Results
Several classes of research questions were exam-
ined as part of this study.  These concern DSS utility,
situation awareness, team communications, and DSS
usability.
DSS Utility
If COs and TAOs considered the DSS to be useful
for tactical decision making, we would expect them to
make use of it during the test scenarios when it was
available.  Similarly, we would expect them to report
that the information provided by it was useful for their
decision processes.
At 1 min. intervals throughout the test scenarios,
subject matter experts recorded whether or not the COs
and TAOs were attending to the DSS.  On the average,
participants were observed to be attending to the DSS at
66% of the time samples.  In many cases, it was possi-
ble to determine to which module(s) they were attend-
ing, and these data are shown in Figure 8.  It can be
seen that the COs tended to use the DSS somewhat
more than the TAOs, particularly for purposes of main-
taining awareness of individual track’s behavior, re-
sponses completed and pending, and the relative prior-
ity of active tracks.  TAOs, on the other hand, tended to
spend more of their time using the DSS to acquire
quantitative track status and sensor data.  Both COs and
TAOs tended to use the upper half of the DSS (i.e.,
Track Summary, Track Profile, and Response Manager
modules) most often.  Self-reports of module usage






























































Figure 8.  Mean percent of time samples where the
CO and TAO were observed attending to DSS mod-
ules.
Note:   TS = Track Summary, TP = Track Profile, RM
= Response Manager, BA = Basis for Assessment, CN
= Comparison to Norms, TL = Track Priority List, AL
= Alerts List.
At the completion of the test session, participants
were asked to complete a questionnaire that called for a
variety of ratings of the DSS.  Figure 9 shows the aver-
age ratings (on a 7-point scale) of how useful the COs
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and TAOs felt the information provided in the DSS
modules was.  Ratings indicate that most modules were
considered to be quite useful for tactical decision mak-
ing, particularly those parts of the DSS designed to sup-
port quick decision making.  COs and TAOs noted that
these modules enabled them to extract key information
rapidly and to visualize track behavior easily.  Partici-
pants considered that the DSS overall offered high util-
ity (average rating = 5.97 of 7-points) for tactical deci-














































































































Figure 9. Mean rating of the usefulness of DSS mod-
ules.
Note:   TS = Track Summary, TP = Track Profile, RM
= Response Manager, BA = Basis for Assessment, CN
= Comparison to Norms, TL = Track Priority List, AL
= Alerts List.
Feedback from the expert CO/TAO teams who
participated in this experiment indicated that the DSS
provided them an excellent summary of the overall tac-
tical situation as well as of key data for individual
tracks.  In particular, COs and TAOs considered that
both the Track Profile and the Basis for Assessment
modules provided important information not readily
available in present day systems.  Since the Track Pro-
file module supported feature matching, which is the
most commonly used decision strategy, its high rating
was anticipated.  Yet, when the track data are conflict-
ing or ambiguous and when the decision maker has time
available, the Basis for Assessment module was rated as
helping substantially.  Note that by encouraging deci-
sion makers to consider the full range of available evi-
dence along with various explanations for it, this mod-
ule reduces the likelihood of mistakenly engaging
friendly or neutral tracks, and was rated highly with
regard to avoiding Blue-on-Blue and Blue-on-White
engagements.
Situation Awareness
Awareness of the tactical situation was examined
via several performance measures.  Specifically, it was
predicted that if the CO/TAO team was more aware of
the tactical situation in a peace-keeping mission, they
would:
• identify the critical contacts earlier and more
accurately;
• take more of the defensive tactical actions re-
quired by the rules of engagement earlier, and
more of the provocative (offensive) actions
later; and
• ask fewer questions to clarify previously re-



































































Figure 10.  Percent of critical contacts reported  as
tracks of interest.
Critical contacts.  During the scenario runs, the
CO/TAO team was probed at prespecified times to
identify the tracks that were considered to be of greatest
tactical interest at that time.  Their responses were con-
trasted with those of an independent group of five sub-
ject matter experts.  As shown in Figure 10, signifi-
cantly more of the critical contacts were identified when
the DSS was available.  Significant differences (p < .05)
were noted at both the early and mid-scenario probes;
performance was comparable at the late probe, how-
ever.  Late in the scenario the critical tracks may be-
come more obvious even without the DSS.  Neverthe-
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less, earlier recognition of critical tracks earlier in the
scenario affords decision makers a broader array of
response options and permits more effective coordina-





















































Figure 11.  Team performance of tactical actions
required by the rules of engagement.
Tactical actions.  Using the rules of engagement as
a benchmark for decision performance in the scenarios,
a group of subject matter experts assessed whether the
CO/TAO teams warned and/or illuminated threat tracks
at specified times and took appropriate defensive ac-
tions.  A modified form of the Anti-Air Warfare Team
Performance Index (ATPI) was used for scoring tactical
performance (Dwyer, 1992), and these data are summa-
rized in Figure 11.  In scenarios when the DSS was
available, CO/TAO teams were significantly more
likely to take defensive actions in a timely manner
against imminent threats (p < .05).  This indicates that
the DSS promoted an earlier recognition of the emerg-
ing risks of the tactical situation.  By contrast, no differ-
ence was observed in the number of tracks that were
warned or illuminated (i.e., provocative actions) when
the DSS was available.   However, several subject mat-
ter experts contended that warnings and illuminations
may not be diagnostic performance indices in these sce-
narios since they represent provocative tactical actions
that commanders may consider to be inappropriate
against certain tracks in a littoral situation.  Not taking
provocative actions would be appropriate and expected
if commanders had assessed that the track was not an
imminent threat, and felt comfortable with prolonging
those actions because they had a good tactical picture -
as would be expected if the DSS was being effective in
meeting its design objectives.
Team Communications
Although the DSS was primarily designed to sup-
port an individual decision maker, the information that
it provides could be expected to influence the team’s
collective decision process.  One way that influence
could be observed is by changes in the team’s commu-
nications.  Therefore, the communications rate, the pat-
tern of communication, and the content of the commu-
nications were compared with and without the DSS.
Communications rate and pattern.  It was hypothe-
sized that when using the DSS, teams would have less
need to exchange data verbally and would, thus, com-
municate less often.  To test this, all voice communica-
tions that requested or provided information were tabu-
lated for each of the 32 test runs.  Since the length of
the scripted test scenarios differed, the total number of
voice communications observed was divided by the






























































Figure 12.  Voice communications rate by message
originator and DSS condition.
Figure 12 shows the mean rate of communications
originating with the CO, TAO, other members of their
team, and others external to the ship’s combat center
(e.g., the battle group commander, the bridge).  A gen-
eral decrease in communications rate with the DSS was
observed.  This decrease remains fairly consistent re-
gardless of who originated the communication.  In fact,
the pattern of communications was unaffected by the
presence of the DSS.  About 40% of the communica-
tions occurred between the CO and TAO, and another
35% occurred between the TAO and the team.  Each of
the remaining links accounts for about 5% or less of the
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total communications.  The decrease in communications
across positions suggests that the DSS supported the
entire team by providing basic data about tracks,
thereby reducing their need to request or provide such
data verbally.
Communications content.  While the pattern of
communications was not found to be affected by the
presence of the DSS, the content of the teams’ commu-
nications may be altered by the DSS.  That is, without
the DSS, teams might need to spend more time ex-
changing basic track data while those with the DSS
might spend the bulk of their time assessing track intent
or evaluating alternate courses of action. To explore the
possibility of a qualitative trade-off in communications,
voice communications were coded by their message
content according to the following scheme:
• Information – exchange of sensor-based data;
• Status – exchange of procedure-based data;
• Clarification – redundant communication to:
elucidate, interpret, or correct other communi-
cations;
• Correlation – association of two or more data;
• Assessment – discussion of expected track be-
havior, likely intent, or future actions;
• Orders – commands to perform an action.
Figure 13 shows the overall average proportion of
communications observed for each of these content
categories.  The largest proportion involved Information
communications, in which sensor-based data were ex-
changed.  This, of course, is not surprising since these
data effectively drive the decision processes.  The rate
of these communications, however, was found to be
lower when the DSS was available2.  Since the DSS
provides much of these data, there was less need for
verbal exchanges among the team.  Similarly, fewer
Correlation communications were observed when using
the DSS.  Although decision makers were less likely to
ask about or report correlation data with the DSS (since
much of it is displayed automatically), they were some-
what more likely to talk about correlations in the data
that they observed on the DSS.  No differences between
DSS and No DSS runs were observed in the other
communications content categories.
                                                



































Figure 13.  Mean proportion of communications by
content category.
Clarification communications.  Overall, about
20% of the communications were for clarification pur-
poses, reflecting uncertainty about track location, kine-
matics, identification, status, or priority.  Figure 14
shows the type of information that was discussed during
clarification communications.  The relative percentage
of each type of clarifying communication is shown
when the DSS was available and when it was not avail-
able.  Thus, it can be noted that clarification communi-
cations about Track Location (e.g., locating the symbol
on the geographic display that corresponds to the track
of interest) and Track Status (e.g., response to warn-
ings) were equally likely whether or not the DSS was
available.  In contrast, clarification communications
about Track Kinematics (e.g., speed or altitude), EW
Information (e.g., IFF and emitter signature), and Tacti-
cal Picture (e.g., track identity and relative position)
were less likely when the DSS was available.  Clarifica-
tions regarding Ambiguous Orders (e.g., incorrect track
























Figure 14.  Relative percent of clarification commu-
nications with & without the DSS.
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The pattern of these findings is actually quite re-
vealing about the information in the DSS that was used
by tactical decision makers.  Since the multi-track geo-
graphic display and the DSS were not linked in this
study, the DSS by itself provided little help in locating
tracks in relation to each other.  Similarly, the DSS pro-
vided no information to decision makers about the
status of actions taken or about tracks’ responses to
warnings.  Thus, no difference between DSS and No
DSS conditions was expected for these types of clarifi-
cations, and the data confirm this prediction.
In contrast, the DSS Track Summary module
showed available track kinematic data, the supplemen-
tary data read-out in the Comparison to Norms module
summarized EW information, and the Track Profile and
Track Priority List modules helped decision makers
prioritize and maintain awareness of the overall tactical
picture.  Therefore, the DSS was expected to reduce the
need to clarify these types of information.  Again, these
predictions were confirmed, especially for the EW in-
formation which was consulted frequently in making
threat assessment decisions.
Although not statistically significant, the tendency
for there to be more clarification communications about
ambiguous orders when using the DSS was interesting.
In fact, we observed a tendency for decision makers to
be more precise in referencing tracks when using the
DSS.  This increased precision thereby encouraged the
team to ask for clarification about which track was be-
ing referenced when ambiguous orders occurred.
This detailed analysis of clarification communica-
tions confirmed that decision makers did indeed use the
information that was displayed in the DSS, even with
only very limited experience with it.  This analysis also
revealed ways in which the DSS might be enhanced to
further reduce the burden of clarification communica-
tions.  For example, linking the geographic display with
the DSS such that selecting a track on either display
would highlight it on the other would probably reduce
the communications to clarify track location.  Similarly,
enhancements to the Response Manager module to
show the status of actions and responses by tracks
would be likely to reduce the need for decision makers
to repeatedly ask about such track status information.
Communications about critical contacts.  The
tracks to which the teams’ communications referred
were also examined under the DSS and the No DSS
conditions.  The hypothesis was that the DSS would
enable teams to focus on the critical contacts more
quickly, resulting in a greater proportion of their com-
munications about those tracks.  The average proportion
of communications about the critical contacts was
slightly greater (but not significant) when using the
DSS3.  It is not particularly surprising that these teams
concentrated the bulk of their communications on the
critical contacts regardless of whether or not they were
using the DSS.  After all, these were highly experienced
tactical decision makers who are accustomed to func-
tioning effectively with their current (non-DSS) sys-
tems.  Thus, greater effects might be obtained with less
experienced decision makers.
DSS Usability
Even if the DSS provides useful information, pro-
motes better situation awareness, and facilitates team
communications, it must also be usable.  That is, deci-
sion makers should consider it easy to learn, easy to
understand, and easy to use.
Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
following the test session in which they rated the us-
ability of the DSS and its modules.  Comments about
the DSS interface were also solicited in the question-
naire and during a follow-up interview.  The overall
rating of DSS usability was high (average rating of 4.16
of 5-points).  Similarly, most modules were considered
easy to use, as shown in Figure 15.  The modules that
promoted “quick-look” assessments of track status, lo-
cation, and priority were rated as more usable.  The
modules that were predominately text-based, particu-
larly the Alerts List, were rated as less easy to use.
The COs and TAOs offered many valuable sugges-
tions for improving the DSS to make it more useful and
usable for tactical decision making and were incorpo-
rated into the DSS-2 described above.  Frequently
heard suggestions included the need to (a) integrate the
DSS display with the geo-plot to simplify track selec-
tion procedures and to display multiple tracks, (b) allow
user-customizable display areas and content, particu-
larly for control window size, range scale, and Response
Manager actions, (c) allow command-override of track
priorities and threat assessments, and (d) provide an
expanded Track Priority List that shows more tracks in
a more graphic/spatial format.
                                                












































































































Figure 15. Mean rating of the usability of DSS mod-
ules.
Note:   TS = Track Summary, TP = Track Profile, RM
= Response Manager, BA = Basis for Assessment, CN
= Comparison to Norms, TL = Track Priority List, AL
= Alerts List.
While several of the usability suggestions by expe-
rienced tactical decision makers concern improvements
to the “look and feel” of the DSS interface, others have
substantial implications for our understanding of their
underlying naturalistic decision processes.  Their call to
integrate the DSS and geo-plot displays and to provide
more tracks in the Track Priority List reminds us that
feature matching decision strategies involve evaluating
tracks within the context of other related tracks and
events.  Decision makers’ requests to permit them to
customize their displays and to override system defaults
have implications for their story generation / explana-
tion-based reasoning strategies.  Namely, decision mak-
ers seem to use a “stepping stone” approach whereby
they use available data to reach an intermediate conclu-
sion about a track, say its priority.  Based on that inter-
mediate conclusion, they then continue to use other data
to explore further implications for that track, given its
priority.  To support such a process, it is clear that deci-
sion makers would want to have the ability to override
and customize their DSS displays.
CONCLUSIONS
Operational decision making predominantly relies
on feature matching strategies.  To a lesser extent when
faced with conflicting or ambiguous data, decision
makers employ story generation or explanation based
reasoning strategies.  Displays that are consistent with
these naturalistic decision making strategies provide the
most useful support to commanders, facilitating the
rapid development of an accurate assessment of the
situation.  Displays that support both feature matching
and explanation based reasoning are recommended for
complex decision making tasks.  While the feature
matching displays will likely be used far more often, the
explanation based reasoning display is of substantial
value under certain circumstances, particularly with less
experienced decision makers.
The DSS was developed for application to Navy
tactical decision making on a single ship in support of
AAW in dense, fast-paced littoral settings.  With some
adaptation, it could support other military decision
situations, including concurrent decisions involving
other warfare areas, higher-level, supervisory decisions
involving multi-ship battle groups, and even collabora-
tion among tactical decision makers in joint service or
multi-national operations.  Several new research proj-
ects are underway to explore these applications.  In ad-
dition to these direct applications to support military
decision making, the decision support and display prin-
ciples identified through this effort are relevant to other
complex decision making settings, such as nuclear
power control, flight control, process control, and dis-
aster relief planning.  Further, additional work is look-
ing at developing derivative displays reflect emerging
theories of decision making, extension of the DSS con-
cepts to other workstations within the CIC, as well as
better integration of DSS modules with shipboard data
processing systems.
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